ABSTRACT
Imagine that a devout government is displeased with the worldwide acceptance by the scientific community of the Copernican paradigm. Deeply convinced of the inherent truth reflected in the idea that "The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose" 3 and ergo that "the world also shall be established that it shall not be moved", 4 yet aware that in the 21st century it is expected to ground this conviction in scientific evidence, it decides, against the protest of its chief scientist, to set up a committee of like-minded experts entrusted with the task of supplying it with this evidence. A committee headed by Mr. Ptolemy, a retired member of its National Scientific Council and comprising two other scientists who retired from prestigious positions in the public service is established. Imagine further that the dedicated work of the Ptolemy Committee generates a report concluding, albeit on the basis of anecdotal evidence, that there is no doubt that from a scientific perspective the entire universe circles around the earth and asserts that this indeed is the prevailing view of the relevant scientific community. This unequivocal conclusion seems to have exceeded even the high expectations of the government. Weary of the reaction of heathen governments and the global community of less creative scientists, and much to the dismay of some of its sanctimonious ministers, it has opted, at least for the time being, for a deferral of the official adoption of the report.
Looking at life through the wrong end of the telescope, much like being nostalgic for the future, may well have its rewards. At times, it may even transcend individual self-deception and become a political force driving a backward-looking revolution. Scientific revolutions, however, do not develop anachronistically. 5 There is a happy distinction to be maintained between science and "the science of things that aren't so." 6 The latter, characterized primarily by a claim of great accuracy substantiated by little more than wishful thinking and sloppy method, is colloquially known as "junk science."
7 Junk science is an epistemic vice. When it is ideologically motivated, it is also an ethical vice. 8 The genesis and the report of the imaginary Ptolemy Committee provide a paradigmatic example of such vices. The genesis and the report of the real-life Committee to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and Samaria, known, after the name of its chairman, Edmond Levy, as the Levy Committee Report (LCR), 9 obviate the need for imagined scenarios, but deserve the same assessment.
On February 13, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then Minister of Justice, Professor Yaakov Neeman, decided to establish a committee to examine the legal status of Israeli construction in the Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. "the West Bank"). 10 The decision, taken despite the opposition of the Attorney General, was a response to both public and legal pressures: in the legal arena, numerous petitions requesting the 5. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). 6. Irving Langmuir, Pathological Sciences, 42 PHYSICS TODAY 36 (1989 [Hebrew] . An English translation of the conclusions and recommendations is available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/ D9D07DCF58E781C585257A3A005956A6, and at http://elderofziyon.blogspot.cz/2012/07/englishtranslation-of-legal-arguments.html#.VjYsRvkrLIV 10. Power resorts to manipulation of language to direct thinking and affect its range. The territory known as "the West Bank" in international legal language, is referred to, in official Israeli language, as "Judea and Samaria," connoting the link between the State of Israel and the Promised Land. See letter from the committee members to Netanyahu and Neeman attached to the LCR, supra note 9.
Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) to order the State to demolish, or implement demolition orders against illegal construction by Israeli settlers in outposts in the West Bank or otherwise order the evacuation of unauthorized such outposts, were pending. In the public arena, right wing elements wanted to establish a legal foundation for existing and planned Jewish constructions in the West Bank and, in the process, refute a 2005 report commissioned, and subsequently approved, by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and then Attorney-General Menachem Mazuz, which concluded that the construction of unauthorized Jewish outposts in the West Bank was illegal (the Sasson Report).
11
The composition of the committee is noteworthy: Justice Levy was the only judge in a panel of eleven judges who accepted a petition submitted by the Gaza Coast Regional Planning against the Government's decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip and evacuate the settlers from the area. In this context, he determined as follows:
Prior to the entry of the State of Israel, there was no sovereign in the area of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip recognized in accordance with international law. Conversely, the State of Israel, which now holds these territories, does so not by virtue of being an 'occupying power', but by virtue of the fact that on the one hand it replaced the Mandate government, and on the other hand, it is the representative of the Jewish people. As such it enjoys not only the historical right to hold and settle in these areas, about which it is not necessary to speak at length but simply to study the Bible, but also a right enshrined in international law. 12 The two other members were Judge Tchia Shapira and Ambassador Alan Baker, a former Israeli ambassador to Canada who resides in a settlement and whose standing on matters relevant to the mandate of the Levy Expert knowledge is based on trust. This is the nexus between epistemology and ethics. It is for this reason that the choice of experts should be based on their relevant qualifications, not on their weltanschauung (worldview). Selecting experts because s/he who makes the selection knows they will support a desired outcome is worse than an epistemic vice. It is an ethical one.
15
The Levy Committee submitted their report on June 21, 2012. The essence of their conclusion is twofold: first, from an international legal perspective, there is no belligerent occupation of the West Bank. Ergo, the law of occupation does not apply and accordingly, there is "no doubt" that the Jewish settlements are not illegal. 16 Second, from the perspective of Israeli public law, the establishment of the outposts has enjoyed implied governmental consent and is thus legal. This Article focuses solely on the first conclusion. This conclusion received scant and generally derisive reaction from the international legal community. 17 This reaction is understandable insofar as the LCR was dismissive of this community, but fails to appreciate not only the political ramifications the LCR may have, 18 but also, and more generally, the epistemological and ethical challenges such 'expert committees' present.
Our main proposition is three-fold: first, the LCR's construction of the law of belligerent occupation purports to introduce a revolution in the discipline: given that there is an overwhelming (and rare) international legal consensus that the territories are occupied, that the law of belligerent occupation applies and that the settlements are illegal and indeed constitute a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the LCR's conclusion purports to advance a paradigmatic shift in international law. 19 Second, the government's attempt to justify the occupation is tantamount to a scientific proposition that the sun revolves around the earth and equally fails to meet the essential requirements for the 17 (Sept. 6, 2012) , http://www.ejiltalk.org/justice-levyslegal-tinsel-the-recent-israeli-report-on-the-status-of-the-west-bank-and-legality-of-the-settlements (the LCR's arguments are "perverse" and, quoting Jeremy Bentham, "nonsense on stilts"); David Kretzmer, Bombshell for the settlement enterprise in Levy report, HA'ARETZ (July 10, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/bombshell-for-the-settlement-enterprise-in-levy-report-1.450170 (noting that the report adopts "old, tired and universally rejected arguments"); Kretzmer, Undoing the State of Israel, JERUSALEM REPORT (July 24, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/JerusalemReport/Israel/Undoing-the-State-of-Israel; Aeyal Gross, If there are no Palestinians, there's no Israeli occupation, HA'ARETZ (July 10, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/ news/diplomacy-defense/if-thereare-no-palestinians-there-s-no-israeli-occupation-1.449988 ("appears to be living in colonial times"); Nathaniel Berman, San Remo in Shilo: The Settlements and Legal History, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/san-remo-in-shilo-the-settlements-and-legalhistory ("The Commission's report operates in something of a parallel legal-historical universe, one in which legal evolution stopped sometime in the 1920s"); Yuval Shany generation of a paradigmatic shift: the arguments advanced by the LCR reflect, individually and in toto, a colonialist/Orientalist paradigm that has been discarded to the dust-bin of history and replaced with a paradigm that rests on the right of peoples to self-determination. It is the latter which currently enjoys the overwhelming support of the members of the international legal community. "The very existence of science," as Khun observed, "depends upon vesting the power to choose between paradigms in the members of a special kind of community." 20 The members of the Levy Committee attempt to initiate a backward looking revolution that rejects the 'nomos,' the normative universe which we inhabit, a universe comprised of law and narrative and held by interpretive commitments regarding what the law means. 21 This rejection explains the LCR's failure to engage with the vast majority of the members of the international legal community. It does not follow that the latter cannot engage with the former. This engagement is the business of this Article.
Third, the LCR's rejection of the nomos inhabited by the international community also explains why it does not advance international legal arguments as an apology for power. The latter operates within the structure of the international legal discourse, not outside it. 22 What the LCR does advance is a particularly idiosyncratic type of a utopian vision that is simultaneously hegemonic and insular: its politics are hegemonic and reflect the political position of the Israeli government; its "nomic insularity" 23 does not. Indeed, Israel has found that working within the structure of international law has thus far served its capacity to translate this very vision into a reality rather than curtailing it. It is quite likely that the Israeli government has not adopted the LCR for this instrumental reason. This is a poor reason for its dismissal; the LCR should not merely be dismissed, it should be rejected: advancing the right of peoples to selfdetermination signifies the compelling general interest of the normative universe which we inhabit. It is this interest which resonates the 20 transformative, even redemptive, spirit of the international legal project.
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In order to substantiate this proposition, Part 2 presents the thesis advanced by the LCR, inclusive of its substantive and methodological bases. Part 3 engages with this thesis: it offers a critical analysis of both its substantive and methodological grounds and proceeds to assess them in the light of the structural requirements for a paradigmatic shift in, and the interpretative commitments of the nomos which we do inhabit. Part 4 concludes. 26 The discussion generates the following inter-related assertions: first, Israel is not a belligerent occupying power in the areas. 27 Second, and alternatively, even if its control over the territories were subject to the law of belligerent occupation, Article 49 paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) is irrelevant to the Jewish settlements in the area. 28 Third, there is a legal basis for Israel's sovereignty over the territory. 29 The inevitable conclusion is that there is "no doubt that from the perspective of international law, the establishment of Jewish settlements in Judea and The assertion that the West Bank is not occupied territory is based on the following two propositions. First, the law of belligerent occupation is premised on a relatively short duration. Israel's presence in and hold over the territories, however, has been lasting for decades and "no one can foresee when or if it will end. . ."
II. THE NOMOS
31 Second, laws of belligerent occupation are applicable only to territories taken from a sovereign state. 32 Given that the annexation of the area by Jordan lacked a legal basis and Jordan since withdrew its claim to sovereignty over the area, the West Bank does not qualify as territories taken from a sovereign state. 33 The LCR provides no legal authorities in support of either of these propositions.
The above assertion obviates the need to consider the application of Article 49 paragraph 6 of the GCIV, which provides that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." 34 The LCR nevertheless decided to posit as an alternative ground for the legality of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, what it considers to be "the prevailing view" regarding the interpretation of this provision. 35 This interpretation posits that the prohibition on the settlements of citizens of the occupying power in occupied territories "was intended to respond to the difficult reality imposed on some of the nations during the Second World War, when some of their residents were deported and forcibly transferred to the territories they had conquered." 36 Read in this light, the LCR concludes that the provision is inapplicable to "those who sought to settle in Judea and Samaria, who were neither forcibly 'deported' nor 'transferred,' but who rather chose to live there based on their ideology of settling the Land of Israel". 37 Methodologically, five sources are cited in support of the assertion that this interpretation constitutes "the prevailing view": the The third leg of the LCR's conclusion relative to the status of the territories under international law grounds Israel's claim to sovereign rights therein in an historical narrative unfolding along the following milestones: (a) the 1917 Balfour Declaration; (b) the reiteration, mutatis mutandis, of the Balfour Declaration in the 1920 San Remo Conference, and (c) Articles 2 and 6 of the 1922 Mandate for Palestine granted to Great Britain by the League of Nations. 43 Methodologically, the LCR assigns no legal significance to the first two documents other than precursors to the Mandate. According to the LCR, the latter established that Palestine is the national home of the Jewish people and granted only civil and religious rights to non-Jewish communities in the area. 44 The subsequent milestones comprising the narrative include: (a) the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 181 (i.e., the partition plan), 45 which, according to the LCR, lacks validity on two grounds. First, it was taken ultra-vires in the light of Article 80 of the UN Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter shall alter the rights of states and peoples as recognized under mandates. 46 1950 illegal annexation of the West Bank by Jordan which, when coupled with its subsequent waiver of any claim to sovereign rights over the area, has restored, as stated in the LCR, "the original legal status of the territory": the Jews, who had a 'right of possession' which they could not exercise in view of the result of a war imposed on them and Jordanian rule, have returned to their land.
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This narrative leads to the conclusion that Israel has a valid claim to sovereignty over the area; that all Israeli governments have taken this position and that the only reason Israel refrained from annexing the area was "to enable peace negotiations with the representatives of the Palestinian people and the Arab states." 50 Indeed, asserts the LCR, Israel never regarded itself as an occupying power "in the classic sense of the term" and ergo never committed itself to apply the GCIV, settling merely for a declaration that it would voluntarily apply its humanitarian provisions. 51 The inescapable conclusion is that its policy has been to allow its citizens to reside in the area out of their own free will, subjecting their continuous presence to the result of the political negotiations process.
52
The Levy Committee inhabits a normative universe: its understanding of international law is inseparable from a narrative. 53 That narrative unfolds a deep conviction in the exclusive right of the Jewish people to sovereignty over the land of Mandatory Palestine. This conviction, indeed vision, informs its construction of international law. Transported to the normative world, this vision posits a revision of international law.
Given that alternative visions do exist and that the normative world provides the bridge between vision and reality, any attempt to advance a revisionist interpretation requires an engagement with alternative visions and the meaning they invest in the normative world. Such engagement, as tense and wrought with conflicts as it surely is, is nevertheless a sine qua non condition for sharing a nomos. An insular vision that fails to be thus engaged and insists on living "an entirely idiosyncratic normative life would be quite mad."
54 This is not a fruitful vantage point from which to advance a revision of our normative universe. It does not follow that change is impossible. It simply requires that its introduction relate to the "disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods and other objects of commitment common to the practitioners of a particular discipline or specialty. . ." 55 In the case at hand, this requirement should have led the members of the Levy Committee to pay a visit to the nomos the international legal community actually inhabits. Their failure to do so is discussed in the following part.
III. THE NOMOS THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY ACTUALLY INHABITS
"I see nobody on the road", said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes", the king remarked with a fretful tone. "To be able to see nobody! And at that distance too!"
The mandate of the Levy Committee did not require it to visit the international legal terrain.
57 It chose to travel that road. This choice is meritorious: international law provides the relevant normative framework for the determination of the status of a territory and the means and methods by which it may be lawfully acquired. 58 The LCR's application of that normative framework to the status of the West Bank, however, defies as it ignores the disciplinary matrix it ostensibly employs. This section substantiates this assessment.
The LCR's proposition that the West Bank does not qualify as a territory under belligerent occupation rested on two beliefs. The first is that the international legal regime of belligerent occupation is premised on a short duration, whereas the Israeli control over the area has no end in sight. 59 Neither doctrine nor principle supports this line of reasoning. 57. The Levy Committee's mandate is to recommend "actions to be taken in order to regularize the construction [of settlements], if possible-or to remove it," and to "promise a due process to the investigation of real estate issues in the territory, in accordance with principles of justice and decency of the Israeli legal and administrative system." See the LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 1. Translation has slightly different wording, "Actions to be taken where possible to legalize or remove construction-all in accordance with the aforementioned policy." 58. UNPRECEDENTED, supra note 11, part A.1. In the context of regulating the acquisition of territory, UNPRECEDENTED properly refers to ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN It is undoubtedly true that the regime is premised on a relatively short duration. It is equally true that the indefinite duration of the Israeli control over the territory defies that premise. 60 It does not follow, however, that the mere duration of a regime (a political phenomenon) transforms its normative classification and affects the applicable legal framework. 61 The suggestion that it does belongs to the alchemy of law and falls outside the matrix of the discipline. It is little wonder that no legal authority was advanced by the LCR to support it. There is none.
Within the applicable normative matrix, the notion that an occupation is a temporary form of control that may not generate permanent results is undisputed and indeed underlies its two other tenets: the principle that occupation does not confer title 62 and the conservation principle. 63 The law of occupation does provide for the provisional status of the regime but fails to set time limits on its duration. 64 Article 6 of the GCIV is the only provision that addresses directly the issue of the duration of an occupation, providing for the continued applicability of only some of the Convention's provisions. 65 Reflecting the drafters' premise that an occupation would normally be of a short duration, this provision may generate counterproductive results in cases of prolonged occupation. Once it became clear that this premise was defied by reality, this provision was abrogated: Article 3(b) of the First Additional Protocol (API) provides for the 60 application of the law of occupation in toto until the termination of the occupation. 66 Indeed, even the Israeli HCJ applies the provisions of the GCIV otherwise precluded by Article 6. 67 Prolonged belligerent occupations are rare. They are an anomaly attesting to the failure of political processes. A political anomaly is not to be confused with a legal anomaly. Prolonged occupations do not vitiate the relevant normative paradigm, and indeed call for extra vigilance in its application. 68 The applicability of the law of belligerent occupation to prolonged occupations has never been questioned by any known primary or secondary source of international law. It is particularly instructive that not only international judicial, quasi-judicial and political institutions 69 but also Israeli authorities resort to it as a matter of course. The argument of the LCR was never made by any Israeli authority responding to petitions emanating from the OPT. This argument was advanced in the petition of the Gaza Coast Regional Council and unequivocally rejected by the Court:
The petitioners deny the claim that the area is under temporary belligerent occupation. , that even the answer to the question whether the military operations have ended is disputed: the commentary cites the Rapporteur of Committee III as defining the "general close of military operations" as "when the last shot has been fired." PICTET, supra note 38, at 62. Given that the vicious cycle of violence in the OPT perpetuates shots being fired, it may well be argued that 'the general close of military operations' is yet to dawn.
67. E.g., article 78 of the GCIV was applied by the HCJ in HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria 56(6) PD 352 [2002] . Note that while Article 78 provides less for the obligations and more for the rights of the Occupying Power, endowing it with the power to subject protected persons to assigned residence and to internment, the fact remains that the Court applied this provision, regardless of Article 6.
68. If anything, prolonged occupation underscores the need to interpret specific provisions in a manner that would ensure that the rights of the occupied population provided for within the normative framework are not further jeopardized. from an area of belligerent occupation. The nature of such an area is that Israelis' presence in it is temporary . . . the possibility of eviction occurring one day hangs over the Israeli's head at all times.
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The notion that a prolonged occupation vitiates the law of belligerent occupation is not merely unfounded in terms of doctrine but also turns principle on its head; in attempting to transform a political anomaly into a legal justification, the LCR posits that a wrong can and does make a right 71 and further responds in the positive to the otherwise incredulous biblical question: "Hast thou killed, and also taken possession?"
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It should finally be noted that the above-cited judicial decision was made pursuant to a political decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and dismantle the settlements. Up to that decision, Israeli authorities equated the 'temporary' with the 'indefinite'. 73 The interplay between the 'temporary' and the 'indefinite' violates one of the basic tenets of the regime, impacts negatively its other tenets and may indeed render the whole regime illegal, but this illegality is an effect of the applicable legal paradigm, not of its absence.
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The second leg on which the LCR's proposition rests is a certain reading of common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, according to which the West Bank does not qualify as a territory under belligerent occupation. This reading is inspired by a narrative that posits Jewish ownership of the land since time immemorial and attempts to turn the vision into a normative reality. This view has long been rejected by the international legal community. The notion that the GCIV is inapplicable to the areas conquered in 1967 is based on a cumulative reading of the two paragraphs and posits that since Jordan was not a lawful sovereign in the West Bank (and that Egypt never claimed sovereign title over the Gaza Strip), the territories were not taken from "a High Contracting Party" and ergo, Israel is not obligated to apply the GCIV.
77
Israel's official position embraced this interpretation and maintained that it is under no obligation to apply the GCIV to the territories, 78 but that it would unilaterally undertake to observe its humanitarian provisions.
79
This position is more nuanced than the position of the LCR in that it refers solely to the applicability of the GCIV and does not deny that the territory is subject to the customary laws of belligerent occupation-laws which apply with respect to territories that were not taken from "a High Contracting Party"-primarily the provisions of part C of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 80 The Israeli HCJ, while routinely applying both The Hague 117, 266 (1971) . The LCR, ¶ 9, reiterates this point and refers to a few judgments of the HCJ which support it, upon concluding its discussion of the international legal perspective on the legality of the settlements.
80. Note that given that it is generally accepted that the Geneva Conventions enjoy customary status, the distinction Israel draws between The Hague and the Geneva Law seems to generate no normative effect. On the customary status of the Geneva Convention see, e.g., JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME 1: RULES (reprinted with corrections 2009); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1966 I.C.J. 226, 257-58 (July 8). The LCR's observation, in ¶ 9, that Israel did not incorporate the GCIV into its internal legislation, implies that the GCIV is not customary and the Geneva Law, has nevertheless refrained from determining the applicability de jure of the GCIV. 81 Yet, even this position was rejected by the relevant institutions of the international community, 82 including the ICJ, 83 the ICRC, 84 and by the vast majority of international legal scholars. 85 The LCR is silent about the rejection of its position, the grounds on which it is based and the scope and nature of its sources.
The major-though not the only-reason for the less than splendid isolation of the Israeli position (and a fortiori albeit implicitly the rejection of the LCR's argument) is that the reading of the first two paragraphs of common article 2 as providing alternative rather than cumulative conditions for the Conventions' application advances the humanitarian objectives of the Conventions. Given that the main impetus for the Geneva law was to advance greater humanitarian protection than hitherto provided, an interpretation which supports this objective is preferred to one that does not. Israel's counter-argument that the GCIV is designed not only to protect the humanitarian interests but also the interests of the ousted sovereign, 86 fails to distinguish between the primary and the secondary purposes of the law and to give preference to the former. Indeed, given the major changes Israel introduced in the area, primarily due to the "settlement enterprise," 87 its concern over the conservation principle can hardly be perceived as reflecting good faith. The fact that its position omits the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the territory underscores the point. 83. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 101, states as follows: "Israel and Jordan were parties to that convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that than convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories".
84 Finally, had the LCR's argument been accepted, the question of where the authority of the military commander, representing the occupying power, derives from would have to be addressed. There are two possible answers to this question: he has been acting ultra-vires or Israel is the lawful sovereign. In the nomos inhabited by the members of the Levy Committee, the latter is the answer. This reading of the law is informed by a strong narrative grounded in the divine promise of the land to the Jewish people. That very narrative was presented to the HCJ in the 1979 landmark case 88 known as Elon Moreh. 89 The Court, in rejecting the authority of the military commander to requisite land in order to establish a settlement on grounds other than military needs, refused to impregnate the law with this narrative. It determined that had the argument that the law of belligerent occupation does not apply been accepted, the inescapable conclusion would be: the military commander acted without authority and the land should be returned to its lawful Palestinian owners. 90 In hundreds of judgments since, the HCJ unequivocally held that the sole source of the legal authority of the military commander is the law of belligerent occupation. 91 In the nomos inhabited by the international community, inclusive of the HCJ, the applicable legal paradigm is the law of belligerent occupation. It is into this alternative nomos 92 that the Levy Committee felt compelled to step in hoping to put to rest any legal challenge to the Jewish settlements 93 in the West Bank. Even if the GCIV were to apply, posits the LCR, the 'prevailing view' is that Article 49 paragraph 6 providing that "the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies," 94 is inapplicable to the Jewish settlers in the West Bank.
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This is so because the settlers are "persons who sought to settle in Judea and Samaria not because they were 'deported' or 'exiled' thereto by force, 102 and the overwhelming majority of international legal experts 103 is that the settlements signify the transfer of residents of the occupying power to the occupied territory, a transfer which the provision prohibits regardless of its motive. This prohibition is customary 104 and is thus applicable even if the international legal community were to accept, miraculously, the LCR's position concerning the inapplicability of the GCIV. 105 The LCR, alas, fails to mention, let alone engage with any of these sources. It does cite the ICRC commentary as a source supporting its interpretation of article 49. 106 The commentary, however, offers no such support and indeed, in the light of the conservation principle, 107 regards any demographic changes as prohibited.
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In this context too, the LCR weaves a self-serving temporal web: in tracing the roots of the prohibition to Nazi Judenrein policies it seeks to suggest the audacity of a comparison between the latter and Jewish settlements in the OPT. 109 The commentary, however, clarifies that the prohibition on such practices predates the Second World War, and indeed was considered customary before the Geneva Conventions came into force.
110 It further sheds light on its meaning and scope: its application is not restricted to forced transfer or deportation; the words 'transfer' and 'deport' "do not refer to the movement of protected persons but to the nationals of the occupying Power", and the paragraph "provides protected persons with a valuable safeguard". 105. See Scobbie, supra note 17. 106. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 5. 107. The conservation principle is articulated in art. 43 of the Hague Regulations, supra note 63, vesting the occupying power with the authority "to take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country" (emphasis added). The conservation principle thus imposes on the occupying power the duty to respect the existing legal, economic and socio-political institutions in the territory. This principle has its origins in the preservation of the sovereignty of the ousted authority. to clearly express that indirect transfer policies are also covered . . . such as confiscation laws, military or other protection of unlawful settlements, as well as economic and financial measures such as incentives, subsidies, exoneration of taxes and permits issued on a discriminatory basis . . . the perpetrator does not need any particular motive or special intent other than the intent of transferring parts of the population of the Occupying Power into the occupied territory. 117 Israel is neither a party to the API nor to the ICCSt in large measure due to these provisions. 118 The ICCSt, however, clearly indicate the "prevailing view" of international law. The LCR could have engaged with this view from a critical position. 119 Instead, it chose to reverse it. It is in this light that one should read the concluding paragraph of the LCR's exposé of the international legal perspective. The Committee, reiterating Israel's unilateral commitment to apply the humanitarian provisions of the GCIV without thereby admitting any legal obligation to do so, proceeds to state that "consequently Israel had adopted a policy that allows Israelis to live in the area out of their own free will according to the rules established by the Israeli government and subject to the review of the Israeli legal system." 120 This conclusion alludes to the prohibition imposed on the occupying power to "transfer directly or indirectly" 121 parts of its population to the occupied area, and appears to posit that the case of the settlements involves neither kind: from each settler's point of view, the decision to reside in a settlement is but an expression of free will.
There is no dispute that Israel did not force its citizens to settle in the West Bank. Yet, the dialectical relationship between consciousness and experience tends to draw a very thin line between being coerced and being coaxed. In the case at hand, the text of "individual free will" is to be read in the context of material governmental intervention.
There are currently over 550,000 settlers living in the West Bank (including approximately 200,000 in East Jerusalem and its surrounding areas).
122 Some of them surely gravitated to the territory on ideological grounds and would probably have done that without governmental incentives. These incentives, however, explain the attraction of the area to the vast majority of Jews residing in the West Bank: coming from the lower socio-economic strata, 123 the lure of subsidized housing located not too far from urban centers, new infrastructure coupled with better public education, health and welfare services that in Israel proper are undergoing privatization, and lower taxes, is a major consideration for settling in the occupied territory. 124 This data suggests that where the LCR sees free will in pure form, a critical examination discloses a disciplinary matrix of law, ideology and political economy.
The construction of a legal status for the settlements is the raison d'être of the Levy Committee. It explains not only its reading of article 46 paragraph 6 of the GCIV but also its determination regarding the irrelevance of the international law of belligerent occupation to the West Bank. However, both are but specific indicators of an "entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given community."
125 Lurking behind the LCR's reading of the law is a vision. The vision is of an international law that vindicates Israel's exclusive sovereignty over the area. That international law, which ostensibly recognized the Jewish people's right to self-determination in Palestine, and only its right, is found in quasi-legal and legal documents from the early 1920s, primarily the 1922 Mandate for Palestine. 126 The clock, it would seem, has not just stopped ticking for the Palestinians; from the LCR's perspective of international law, it has actually turned back to the era of colonialism, and, given the specificity of the chronotopy, 127 of "Orientalism."
128 This is the context which illuminates the text of the Balfour Declaration, the San Remo Resolution and the British Mandate.
Noblesse oblige: The Balfour Declaration was made in a letter written by one nobleman, Lord Arthur James Balfour, then Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, to another, Baron Walter Rothschild, son of the first Jewish peer in England. It is perhaps no coincidence that the paradigmatic example Edward Said uses to explain the specific juxtaposition of knowledge and power that constitutes the Orientalist nomos is a lecture given by the very same Lord Balfour to justify the need for Britain to continue to exercise control over Egypt. 129 The then dominant international legal paradigm, that "Gentle Civilizer of Nations," 130 provided the colonialist enterprise with a seemingly objective, scientific apology for "the continuing subjugation of various regions of the world."
131 Within the Orientalist paradigm, the indigenous population of Palestine, not European Jewry, was construed as the "other." The recognition of the latter's right to build "a national home in Palestine," simultaneously preserving their political rights in Europe, 132 was not perceived as an anomaly. Yet, even then, there was a whiff of change. The demise of the colonial project is attributable to a myriad of factors, including unease with the gap between self-proclaimed Western values of self-determination and equality and the dispossession and subjugation of the rest of the world. Europe remained the center of gravity, but it could no longer retain the identification of the European order with the international one. Membership in the League of Nations, which for the first time included non-European states on a footing of equality with European states, is one indicator that an alternative paradigm was emerging. In this context, the success of the Zionist movement to secure recognition in "the historical connection of the Jewish People with Palestine" and in the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,"
133 should be read against its failure to substitute the term "title" for "connection" and to secure Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people. 134 The interpretation offered by then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, in his White Paper further signifies this change: the Balfour Declaration, he clarified, never contemplated that "Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine them to rethink the validity of their own astro-nomos. In such rethinking, alas, they have not engaged.
The noble of a by-gone nomos often becomes the ignoble of later years. Loss of faith in the colonialist paradigm led to the consideration of alternatives, 137 and eventually to its complete denunciation. The current membership in the United Nations attests to the overwhelming acceptance of the new paradigm, revolving around the core principles of sovereign equality, self-determination and non-intervention. 138 It is not without significance to recall that given that these principles have not been inscribed on a tabula rasa, "alien occupation," i.e., the exercise of effective control by a foreign military force over a territory over which it has no title and without the volition of the sovereign, 139 echoes the soggy saga of the discarded paradigm. It is for this reason that the disciplinary matrix of international law groups belligerent occupation together with colonial domination, racist regimes 140 and related practices of "subjugation, domination and exploitation."
141 A new international legal order has replaced the Eurocentric legal order. The LCR remains deeply rooted in the latter.
The LCR's anachronistic reading of the international legal matrix, in terms of both the epistemic method used and its ontological consequences, is the Ariadne's thread that is woven into its construction of the invalidity of the 1947 Partition Plan; the indeterminacy of the 1949 armistice lines and Jordan's 1988 waiver of a claim to sovereignty over the West Bank, 142 in a manner that generates the foregone conclusion that Israel has a valid claim to sovereignty over the area. This claim, asserts the LCR, has been upheld by successive Israeli governments, which refrained from realizing it through annexation only because of their wish to "enable peace negotiations." economic union within these borders with Jerusalem and Bethlehem as corpus seperatum), 144 was subject to some debate at the time but not for the reasons advanced in the LCR. The debate focused on the competence of the General Assembly: on the one hand, it is not a legislative body, and it is empowered merely to make recommendations; 145 on the other hand, the General Assembly succeeded the Council of the League of Nations and the latter was competent to make binding decisions regarding Mandate territories. 146 The rejection of the Resolution by Arab States, posited in the LCR as a ground for its invalidity, 147 reflected their sense that the partition was inequitable and that the proposed Arab State would not be economically viable. 148 This stand was surely significant politically, but not legally. By contrast, Israel's embrace of the Resolution, which the LCR is silent about, carries a normative impact: given that its 1948 Declaration of Independence incorporates a paragraph from the Resolution, 149 Israel is arguably estopped from arguing against the Resolution's validity.
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The LCR is equally silent about the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which also accepted the Resolution as providing international legitimacy to the "right of the Palestinian Arab people to national sovereignty and independence." 151 Finally, in the words of the ICJ, "the responsibility of the United Nations" in matters relative to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "has its origin in the Mandate and the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine . . ." 152 Having been referred to in numerous later resolutions, including the resolution which requested the ICJ to render an advisory opinion on the legality of the construction of the wall in the OPT, 153 it reflects the universally accepted basis for the establishment in the land of Mandatory Palestine of "two independent States, one Arab, the other Jewish."
154
The road leading the Levy Committee to its destination regarding exclusive Jewish sovereignty over Mandatory Palestine passes through two additional signposts: the 1949 armistice lines and the 1988 Jordanian waiver of sovereignty over the West Bank. The armistice lines were drawn in various agreements, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 62 (1948) . 155 The Rhodes agreement of April 1949 between Israel and Jordan, fixed the demarcation line known as the "Green Line." 156 The latter was never officially designated as a final boundary and indeed the agreement itself allows for revisions by mutual consent. 157 It does not, however, follow that the Green Line is devoid of legal meaning, let alone that Israel has a sovereign right in the OPT. Quite the opposite: so long as such consent has not been reached, and given the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force, "the Palestinian territories east of the Green Line", in the words of the ICJ, "are occupied."
158 By the same token, Jordan's waiver of its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank does not generate the LCR's conclusion that said waiver "has restored the original legal status of the territory," that is, Jewish sovereignty. 159 It does not because under the prevailing international legal paradigm, the original legal status of the territory was not, and was not intended to be, under Jewish sovereignty. 160 The nomos inhabited by the members of the Levy Committee consists of entirely different terrains and shades of visibility. In it, there is no Palestinian people vested with a right to self-determination; the West Bank is terra nullius, 161 an empty space; "a land without people" still awaiting to be restored "to a people without a land;" 162 a land over which Jews have always had a right of possession; a land promised once by the good Lord and once again by another Lord representing the British Empire; indeed; a land impregnated with Jewish sovereignty. In the nomos inhabited by the rest of the international community, there is a right to self-determination. That right exists erga omnes. 163 That right "was the ultimate objective of the mandate system." 164 That right stems from a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. 165 The Palestinian people enjoy this right, and thus have a claim to sovereignty over the territory. Israel is under an obligation to respect this right. 166 The admission of Palestine as a Member State to various international governmental organizations, 167 coupled with Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute, 168 has not settled the debate whether or not it meets the criteria of statehood, 169 but it surely attests to the overwhelming view of the international community on the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination in the form of a Palestinian State in the OPT.
There can be little doubt that Israel's actual display of respect for the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the OPT leaves a lot to be desired. From a normative perspective however, and contrary to the assertion of the LCR, since the early 1990s, successive Israeli governments did recognize this claim and they continue to do so.
In the various agreements constituting the Oslo Accords 170 signed by then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel recognized the PLO for the first time as the representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledged the reciprocal political rights of both parties, and specifically recognized the Palestinian's people right to acquire sovereignty over much of the OPT. 171 Indeed, this recognition, as the LCR should have but failed to acknowledge, severed any possible nexus between the former Jordanian rule in the West Bank and the question of Israel's sovereignty over the territory. 172 Neither the second intifada, nor the governments formed later by a Likkud-led coalitions invalidated these agreements. 173 The odyssey undertaken by the Levy Committee requires it to explain why Israel, as the lawful sovereign of the West Bank, did not simply annex it. The explanation, according to the LCR, is Israel's wish "to enable peace negotiations."
175 This policy assessment may well qualify as an apology for power, but it is neither a legal argument, nor is it convincing in view of the de jure annexation of Jerusalem, 176 surely a major issue in the peace negotiations. Indeed, it serves to obfuscate rather than illuminate the puzzle. Could it not be that Israel did not annex the territories because it has, at least thus far, gained more than it lost by keeping its current form of control over the OPT? The ontology of this occupation, suggests that indeterminacy is its determinate feature, and offers an alternative explanation. 177 According to this suggestion, Israel acts in the territory as a sovereign insofar as it settles its citizens there and extends to them its laws on a personal and on a mixed personal/territorial bases, yet insofar as the territory has not been formally annexed and insofar as this exercise of sovereignty falls short of giving the Palestinian residents citizenship rights, Israel is not acting as a sovereign. In this manner, Israel enjoys both the powers of an occupant and of a sovereign in the OPT, while Palestinians enjoy neither the rights of an occupied people nor the rights of citizenship. This indeterminacy allows Israel to avoid accountability in the international community for having illegally annexed the territories, while pursuing the policies of "greater Israel" in the West Bank without jeopardizing its Jewish majority. 177. Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 60, at 609-12. Note that the interplay between the temporary and the indefinite, supra text and notes 59-72, and between occupation / non occupation (as attested to by the application of the GCIV by the HCJ while never acknowledging that it is under an obligation to do so), supra text and notes 74-81, operates in the context of annexation / nonannexation as well.
178. Id. at 610-11 (footnotes omitted).
governmental and judicial authorities to the territory has served as an apology for power, which has facilitated the piecemeal realization of this vision. The LCR steps out of the structural confinements of the discipline.
It does not present an argument intra-legem. It is, quite simply, contralegem. It reflects an insular vision of power and destiny that that requires no apology. The profession of faith is not to be confused with a profession. The deep conviction shared by the members of the Levy Committee in the sovereign right of the Jewish people to the entire land of Mandatory Palestine is not shared, as posited above, by the community comprising the international legal profession. The failing of the LCR is not, however, to be attributed to the mere fact that its reading of the relevant international legal paradigm differs from the prevailing view. The position maintained by a majority is not necessarily closer to the truth than the position espoused by the few. It is not a quantitative but a qualitative blemish, consisting of both epistemological and ethical elements, that stains the LCR. In epistemic terms, inhabiting a nomos in an engaged, productive way, much like working creatively within a disciplinary matrix may well require the poetic imagination of Don Quixote but also the pragmatic bookkeeping of Sancho Panza. The disciplinary straightjacket is the mantle of the creative scientist. 181 The members of the Levy Committee appeared, initially, to have willingly donned this mantle. 182 Appearances, alas, are notoriously deceiving:
183 their international legal mantle has been woven from the same fabric used for the making of the emperor's new clothes. The Levy Committee did not merely offer an interpretation of the prevailing international legal paradigm different from that shared by the 179. Gross, supra note 17, makes a somewhat similar point when he observes that the Levy Committee's conclusions are "helpful in piercing the veil of legal hypocrisy behind Israeli control in the territories. majority of experts; it ignored them and advanced a paradigm they had discarded. Given that the old paradigm was not merely discarded but discredited, and given further that "the very existence of science depends upon the vesting of power to choose between paradigms in the members of a special kind of community,"
184 it is no wonder that the LCR's attempt to change the rules of the game was met with little more than professional derision. 185 It does not follow that, at times, an out-of-date paradigm cannot be resurrected "as a special case of its up-do-date successor," as Kuhn acknowledges, but "it must be transformed for the purpose." 186 No trace of such transformation can be detected in any of the stale arguments of the LCR. From a disciplinary perspective the outcome is "just a research failure, one which reflects not on nature but on the scientist [s] ." 187 A research failure is a matter internal to the professional community. A professional community, however, is more than a body of knowledge shared by its members. It is also engaged in a relationship with the society that expects to benefit from the knowledge, without being able to evaluate its professional merits. 188 It is for this reason that trust is the defining feature of this relationship. From this perspective, for an expert body, such as the Levy Committee, to give the impression that one's views speak for the community of experts, when they do not, is not "just a research failure." It is also an ethical obstruction. 189 The focus on the methodology employed in the LCR offers a critique of the epistemological and ethical foundations of its attempt to revise the prevailing international legal paradigm. Insofar as a move from paradigm to paradigm presents the question "where in this movement can one discern the ethical?," 190 this critique also extends to the substantive objective of the LCR. The formal objective of the Levy Committee was to legalize the outposts. The text of the LCR discloses a far more ambitious telos: to offer a legal framework for the extension of Jewish sovereignty to the West Bank. 191 The offering of an organizing principle for a community to adopt is the essence of utopian thinking. Insofar as a real place is experienced by a community as no place (outopia) generating a wish to reach a good place (eutopia), 192 there is nothing wrong with such thinking. There is also nothing wrong in impregnating legal texts with a meaning that reflects a particular vision shared by a minority. Indeed, in pluralistic communities, such as the international community, a majority is not ipso facto right. The question of right or wrong depends on the nature of the utopian vision, as determined by the relevant community in a discursive process. A nomic insularity that does not engage in this process renounces it. The members of the Levy Committee inhabited such an "enclosed nomian island." 193 The relevant community relative to the real place defined as the Mandatory land of Palestine is the international community, as represented by the United Nations, as reiterated by its main judicial organ. 194 That community, comprising of international legal experts and non-experts alike, has determined that the right to self-determination in the form of sovereignty over the land is granted to both the Jewish and the Palestinian peoples. 195 The realization of that right only by the Jewish people is generally viewed as regressive, and the paradigmatic move advanced by the LCR as ethically dystopian. Its realization by both is progress. The prevailing international legal paradigm is designed to facilitate this progress, not to jeopardize it. 196 Between the design and its implementation, however, lay the indeterminacy of the discipline and the relative weakness of its authority structure, allowing Israel to speak the law as it advances the very vision of the Levy Committee. 197 The LCR provides it with no incentive to discontinue this practice. But the compelling interest of the international community in eradicating such practices should. That interest has been disclosed in the arduous struggle for self-determination and substantiated in the nomos that has transformed it from a political aspiration into a right erga omnes and a core principle of the community. 198 The international legal project is about such transformations. 
